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Book Reviews
National Security
The Russia Trap: How Our Shadow War with Russia
Could Spiral into Nuclear Catastrophe
By George Beebe
Reviewed by James P. Farwell, associate fellow in the Centre for Strategic
Communication, Department of War Studies, Kings College, University
of London, and a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute
in Washington

G

eorge S. Beebe served as the director of the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Russia analysis and was Vice President Dick Cheney’s
adviser on Russia. Savvy and insightful, he contravenes the conventional
wisdom calling for increased pressure on Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin
for its disruptive activities in US elections, Europe, and other places. In an
excellent new book, The Russia Trap, he lays out a clear history of modern
Russian relations with the West, explaining how tensions escalated after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, where we are headed, and the grave
risks the current trajectory poses.
He begins with a proposal: The United States and Russia are fighting
an undeclared virtual war. It is not a cold war between two ideological
adversaries but a shadow war in which the two nations are competing
for strategic advantage without direct use of military force. While the
United States pioneered the use of soft power, Moscow has learned fast.
The weapons include cybersabotage, cyberespionage, and
cyberinfluence. These confluent tactics, he argues, create escalating
spirals of aggression and suspicion. In a networked, globalized world in
which digital networks, national economies, media systems, and nuclear
command and control systems are all linked together in some way, it
is difficult to limit damage inflicted from any of these cyber weapons.
The potential consequences of these attacks could range from armed
hostilities to nuclear war.
Beebe’s strength has always been as an analyst and grand strategist.
One of his keenest skills lies in his ability to see how the other side thinks
and acts. He recognizes America’s agenda looks different in the eyes of
Moscow. The Russian government “sees ‘instability and destabilization’
as the defining characteristic of US foreign policy” (27). In this view,
Russia is a victim, not a perpetrator, of disruption and the United States
has brought disorder, not prosperity.
He traces the history of US-Russia relations over the last three
decades, from Kosovo to the Arab Spring—Libya and Syria. As relations
have evolved—perhaps more accurately, devolved—the United States
and Russia each views itself as engaged in legitimate, defensive, and
benign actions, while the other engages in the opposite. These attitudes
reinforce one another, deepening mistrust and eliminating important
brakes on escalatory spirals.
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Americans dismiss Russian objections to an eastward expansion
of NATO or efforts to foster democracy in Russia. Russia, Beebe
argues, feels threatened by NATO and sees activities like the National
Endowment for Democracy as fostering sentiment in Russia intended
to ignite regime change. Beebe feels the nations are experiencing brake
failure. The Cold War was fought over a set of rules that imposed vital
restraint. Today’s shadow war lacks them. The US withdrawal from the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has intensified suspicions, and the Kremlin
rejects as implausible the explanation that the US focus is Iran, rather
than exploiting a perceived Russian vulnerability. Problems with other
strategic arms control agreements deepen the challenge.
Russian meddling in the 2016 US election raised emotions to a new
high. Washington responded with tough sanctions aimed at squeezing
Russia into submission. In Beebe’s view, that strategy is doomed and
more likely to make the Kremlin more aggressive.
He discusses a scenario that could trigger all-out war, closely tied
to a plausible rendering of current events; it is a nightmare scenario.
Beebe also offers a series of initiatives to absorb shocks wrought by
security tensions. He defines these as surprise developments that diverge
suddenly and sharply from the trends preceding them. As examples, he
cites the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the 2008 financial crisis, and
the Arab Spring. The challenges are not linear. We must recognize this
and build resilience into the system to achieve stability.
Solutions Beebe proposes include resilience through more
frequent and open personal communication between officials. Critical
infrastructure requires technical resilience. Informal understandings
such as those following the Cuban missile crisis are vital. He argues we
need to look beyond our relations with Russia, incorporating them into
mutually beneficial strategies, such as checkmating Chinese expansion.
Beebe knows his subject. He has thought long and hard about the
challenges US-Russia tensions pose. He understands the escalatory risks
and argues cogently for practical approaches that lower tensions and
reduce the risk of accident or strategic miscalculation leading to war.
The Russia Trap is a must read. It is well written, informing, enlightening,
and provides a needed perspective that lights the road ahead to strength
and stability.

Book Reviews: National Security

113

On Absolute War: Terrorism and the Logic of Armed Conflict
By Eric Fleury
Reviewed by LTC Nathan K. Finney, US Army

W

restling with the underlying elements of theory—picking it apart
and refashioning it to describe the issues we face today—can be
a challenge for military members engaged in the day-to-day rigors of a
career in the armed forces.
Fortunately, Eric Fleury’s On Absolute War provides a compelling
example of how to think deeply about the underlying logic of military
theory and its application to contemporary problems. Initially, based
on the title and the table of contents, I was expecting to find terrorism
explained with well-known Clausewitz quotes. I could not have been
more mistaken. Fleury digs thoroughly into theory—specifically the basic
logic of Clausewitz’s On War, including its purpose and application—and
then uses it to fashion his own concept which he then applies to the
underlying drivers and dynamics of terrorism as a method of warfare,
creating a general theory of terrorism. I was exceedingly skeptical at
first but by the end, On Absolute War convinced me of the merits of
Fleury’s approach.
Using the structure of On War as a model, On Absolute War begins
with a dialectical comparison of terrorism and conventional warfare,
which includes a more nuanced look at the former through the assessment
of terrorism as practiced by both state and nonstate actors. Through
case studies he explains the dynamics of terrorism and its inherent goal
of perpetual escalation, militarizing all sides to a conflict in a manner
that approaches absolute war as described by Clausewitz. Finally, Fleury
grafts the Clausewitzian concept of battle onto terrorism demonstrating
how a theory of terrorism can describe the relationship between the
state and its citizens under this form of warfare.
What is so impressive about On Absolute War is its nuance and
understated breakthroughs. Fleury undoubtedly understands On War
better than most, going beyond the surface of Clausewitz’s work into
what drove the development of his theory and the logic behind it. He
recognizes and uses techniques that make On War a relevant to military
art and science to this day. In addition to adopting a dialectic approach,
Fleury focuses on key elements of the Clausewitzian theory such as
the permanent interplay of human nature and historical evolution. By
understanding these elements, Fleury is able to progress beyond simply
applying Clausewitzian phrases or surface-level ideas to his own work,
and instead engages the underlying theory as it relates to terrorism in
order to ascertain something wholly new. In the process, he advances
beyond the analysis of the last few decades, which “have precluded a
more fundamental examination of how to understand the nature of
war between such dissimilar combatants”—terrorist and conventional
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forces (2). Fleury determines that we “must reevaluate the nature of the
conflict itself, not just revise its tactics” (5).
The most innovative and thought-provoking concept in Fleury’s
work is the idea that “terrorism is an attempt to approximate a condition
of absolute war in reality as much as possible” that strives to bypass
“traditional limits of warfare, especially friction and reciprocity,” to
coerce all actors to escalate their actions, and thereby create ever more
militarized communities on all sides, ultimately aiming to “reorient
. . . loyalties around the architects of the campaign” (5). Contrary to
traditional military perspectives on absolute war—that it includes
nuclear weapons and threatens the end of humankind—the nuanced
and analytical approach Fleury uses to make such a case for terrorism is
quite masterful.
Despite its many strengths, On Absolute War is not perfect. While
Fleury’s overall assessment of the motivations behind the Global War
on Terror, and his descriptions of approaches taken in its prosecution
are well summarized, he somewhat mischaracterizes the counterand anti-terrorism policy continuum from the Bush to the Obama
administrations. While the former certainly viewed a campaign against
terrorism as global, and the commitment as total, the latter fundamentally
changed its focus and approach, attempting to back away from and solve
challenges created by the former. Small details like these are almost
inconsequential, however, given the intellectual innovation and insight
gained throughout the rest of the book.
On Absolute War is my top recommendation for 2019. On Absolute War
presents a strong theoretical and intellectual framework for planners,
strategists, and decision makers in the national security realm. Thinkers,
planners, and strategists—even those not interested in terrorism—stand
to gain valuable insight into how to dissect, reformulate, create, and write
about military theory. Fleury has provided not only an insightful general
theory for terrorism, but guidance on engaging with theory in general.
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Military History
The Girls Next Door: Bringing the
Home Front to the Front Lines
By Kara Dixon Vuic
Reviewed by Dr. Jacqueline E. Whitt, associate professor of strategy, US Army
War College

K

ara Dixon Vuic’s second book, The Girls Next Door: Bringing the
Home Front to the Front Lines, should have been written ages ago, yet
it is well-timed to make a meaningful impact on the field today. Both
academic and analytical, this serious yet accessible and expertly written
book centers on the physical and emotional experiences of the women
who volunteered to work in wartime troop support programs and whose
service as historical agents and important actors in a broader story might
have been marginalized or absent from other accounts.
Vuic captures and preserves the unique voices and stories of
these women and presents a straightforward and compelling case for
the careful study of people who move in and around military circles
in wartime. She offers critical analysis, avoids jargon and theory-laden
discursive passages, and makes it clear through her construction and
analysis that she is well attuned to more academic concerns.
While war accounts often center on male combat experiences, The
Girls Next Door focuses on women and their service to the nation during
war. The book rounds out the reader’s understanding of women’s wartime
work when accounts of these official recreation and entertainment
responsibilities are considered alongside studies of women laboring in
wartime industrial jobs and serving in uniform. Vuic connects conceptual
ideas about the home front and the battlefront—these women were
employed in programs specifically designed to “domesticate the military
environment,” and these “recreation programs variously sought to
combat prostitution, remind soldiers of their mothers or sweethearts,
and symbolize a supportive American home front” (1).
Take a moment to reread the program goals: it is a whiplash-inducing
set of expectations for young women to navigate. Their tensions are
palpable throughout the book: be wholesome and pretty, but not too
pretty. Be friendly and available, but not too available. Remind them
(simultaneously?) of their mother and their sweetheart at home. Make
friends but do not become too attached—some of them are going to
die. Work, travel abroad, and be independent, but move and live under
strict constraints to protect your safety. Boost soldier morale and bear
the burden of men’s emotions and experiences of war, but do not let your
vulnerabilities show.
Vuic expertly walks readers through these complexities, bringing
challenges to the forefront and embedding them within her deeper
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analysis of social and cultural changes in the United States—especially
regarding race, gender roles, and sexuality—that affected both the
institutional role of these women and their recreation and entertainment
work experiences. She also clearly recognizes that these women, while
working within structural and institutional constraints, sometimes
changed and subverted the instrumental institutional aims and exercised
agency to shape and interpret their experiences.
Vuic moves chronologically through the twentieth century,
beginning roughly with the First World War and culminating with an
examination of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. The Second World War
merits two chapters, one of which examines the unique challenges of
race, colonialism, and exoticism in the Pacific and China-Burma-India
theaters. In the epilogue, Vuic offers a brief speculative commentary on
how women as entertainers and morale/recreation workers factor into
twenty-first-century American military engagements.
Vuic’s choice to organize each chapter with a different format and
thrust, depending on the most relevant analytical categories and sources,
is refreshing. The chapters stand well on their own and do not feel
forced into an artificial structure, although I did find myself occasionally
wishing for a deeper dive on the institutional side: How were women
selected, trained, equipped, funded, supervised, and evaluated? How did
differences in these patterns affect experiences and expectations?
By the end of the book, one point is crystal clear: women are not
peripheral to military history or to the history of war more broadly.
Gender and sexuality are central to these fields. Further, historians of
women and of gender should also make the careful study of military and
wartime contexts central to their work. By focusing on women who were
employed in official entertainment and recreation work, Vuic clearly
proves military history, the history of war and society, women’s history,
and the history of gender and sexuality are intertwined. Her spot-on
epilogue highlights the challenges arising as women have become fully
integrated members of the military profession: “Organizations that held
up women as symbols of both wholesome and sexualized ideals placed
them in untenable and often dangerous situations. And, recreation and
entertainment programs that offered women as antidotes to the military
suggested that they had no place in it” (271).
Contemporary military leaders of gender-integrated units who
want to understand more clearly how complex ideas about gender roles,
sexuality, masculinity, femininity, and domesticity have operated within
the military sphere should add The Girls Next Door to their reading
lists. It is more important than ever for members of the twenty-firstcentury US armed forces to understand the military’s historical pattern
of reinforcing binary and traditionally conservative gender roles and
create a new organizational culture that welcomes and includes women
as full members.
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Maxwell Taylor’s Cold War: From Berlin to Vietnam
By Ingo Trauschweizer
Reviewed by Frank Jones, professor of security studies, US Army War College

N

early thirty years have passed since Douglas Kinnard published
The Certain Trumpet: Maxwell Taylor and the American Experience in
Vietnam. Kinnard, a retired Army brigadier general and later professor
of political science, was no stranger to Taylor. He served on Taylor’s
personal staff when Taylor was Army chief of staff, and spent hours
interviewing him. Now Ingo Trauschweizer, an Ohio University history
professor, offers a different portrait of Taylor—one long overdue.
In this well-researched book, Trauschweizer provides a balanced
and meticulous appraisal of Taylor’s career from 1945 until the general’s
death in 1987. This perspective advances our understanding of Taylor
through the author’s adroit use of archives, high-quality secondary
sources published since the 1990s and, most notably, declassified
information Kinnard did not have access to in the 1980s.
As Trauschweizer highlights in the introduction, Taylor’s detractors
are legion. They viewed him as a ruthless, mendacious, manipulative
micromanager or worse. Yet when he died, obituary writers and
politicians lionized him, citing his long service to the nation and brilliant
career. He remains an extraordinary example of an American leader in
the twentieth century—soldier, presidential adviser, diplomat, business
executive, and public intellectual. Trauschweizer brings each of these
roles into view with clarity, using speeches, articles, and Taylor’s books
to flesh out this accomplished officer’s strategic thinking and judgment.
These last two points are unmistakable in the chapters on Taylor’s
stint as West Point superintendent, and, even more impressively,
as Commanding General of the Eighth Army in South Korea and
Commanding General, US Forces Far East. As superintendent, Taylor
brought a different emphasis to the US Military Academy’s curriculum,
one that contemporary officers, regardless of rank, should heed: the ability
to think critically, communicate clearly, and employ military history for
leadership development. These strategic leader competencies are visible
in Taylor himself. His ability to use popular magazines and elite journals
such as Foreign Affairs to discuss world events and the Army’s missions is
an important element of Trauschweizer’s intellectual biography. Taylor
understood the military instrument of power encompassed more than
the use of force. His 1948 Kermit Roosevelt Lecture, delivered two years
before NSC-68, is a testament to his prescience and comprehension of
the military strategy needed for the Atomic Age. His command of US
forces in West Berlin (1949–51), an island in a sea of Soviet power during
a period of intense hostility on America’s Cold War front lines, was
masterful. Trauschweizer underscores how Taylor used the instruments
of national power in this assignment and the economic instrument
in particular, working with his chief economist to make the Marshall
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Plan a reality, rebuilding war-torn Berlin. Trauschweizer’s discussion
of Taylor’s guiding hand to implement the Korean War armistice and
postwar activities buttresses the argument that Taylor was a strategist
of high order who understood the criticality of aligning ends, ways,
and means.
Equally important, Trauschweizer underscores Taylor’s assessment
of World War II—it was not simply the attainment of victory. More
broadly, Taylor recognized the war as an imperative for mobilizing the
American public in support of national interests, policy objectives, and
the US military. He grasped that the role of the military leader is to
improve relations with civilians, both political leaders and American
society, especially in a military dependent on conscription.
Taylor’s faith in the indispensable role of the infantryman was
never far from his mind as he attempted to organize the Army for
the atomic battlefield as chief of staff. The disagreements between
President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Taylor resulted from differing
strategic visions, but as the author points out neither Eisenhower nor
Army Secretary Robert Stevens had Taylor as their first pick for chief.
Despite this fraught association, and the friction it created, Taylor’s wise
stewardship at a time of major transition in strategy, coupled with budget
battles with a president determined to cut defense spending and service
turf fights, should not be dismissed. Taylor’s thinking about deterrence
and operations below the nuclear threshold is valuable and relevant,
worthy of study by today’s strategists.
Yet Taylor is recalled as the Kennedy administration’s doyen. His
book The Uncertain Trumpet transfixed the president—here was a general
with new thinking. Taylor’s first assignment for JFK was a bureaucratic
labor—assessing what went wrong with the Bay of Pigs invasion of
Castro’s Cuba, a catastrophic failure and political embarrassment.
Taylor’s advice and the trust he engendered with Kennedy led to his
appointment as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962, a position
he held into the Lyndon Johnson presidency. Johnson found Taylor’s
counsel similarly valuable and made him ambassador to South Vietnam
as America’s entry into the war was in play.
Like so many among the “Best and Brightest,” Taylor’s legacy is
tainted by Vietnam. He bears responsibility for that fiasco, which
he acknowledged publicly years later. Perhaps his optimism about
achieving US policy objectives was unrealistic, but he had an affliction
common among those who fought in World War II—they had difficulty
understanding their North Vietnamese adversary, perhaps out of hubris
and cultural insensitivity. Likewise, Taylor’s ignorance of the workings
of the North Vietnamese Central Committee, vital to assessing strategic
risk, was endemic in the US government. But even more fundamental,
US leaders could not reframe the environment. Here Taylor’s critical
thinking skills, the unerring judgment Eisenhower lauded him for in
Crusade in Europe, failed him abysmally.
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Kinnard ends his book by contending Taylor is a transitional figure,
the link between “heroic generals” of World War II and “managerial
generals” of the postwar period. Trauschweizer’s book presents sufficient
evidence to suggest a third group. Taylor was ahead of his time, a
forerunner of a new school, the politico-military general, fulfilled in
such figures as Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft and General Colin
Powell—generals endowed with the expertise and aptitude to move
proficiently between the civilian and military realms as presidential
agents and policy entrepreneurs. This conclusion may be Trauschweizer’s
most significant contribution to the study of civil-military relations in
the post-Goldwater-Nichols era.

My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness
By Howard Jones
Reviewed by Dr. Ron Milam, executive director, Institute for Peace & Conflict,
Texas Tech University

M

any books have been written about the My Lai Massacre during
the Vietnam War—most notably Michael Bilton and Keven Sims’
Four Hours in My Lai (1992). The latest and most complete book, and
certainly the most thoroughly documented of the very tragic story, is
Howard Jones’ My Lai: Vietnam, 1968, and the Descent into Darkness. Jones’s
book illuminates new issues associated with the tragedy that occurred
on March 16, 1968, in the village of Sơn Mỹ in Quang Ngai Province,
Republic of Vietnam. Telling this story is difficult for authors, and
Professor Jones has done it well.
To summarize the military operation that took place that day, soldiers
from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment of the
11th Brigade of the 23rd Infantry Division—known as the Americal
Division—were ordered to enter several hamlets and eliminate, destroy,
kill, or any one of several verbs soldiers understood to mean destroying
everything that lived in the village. An artillery barrage would precede
the operation since it was supposedly market day, and the soldiers were
told there would be no noncombatants in the area, and anyone there
would be either Viet Cong (VC) or VC sympathizers. The 48th National
Liberation Front battalion was known to be operating in the area, and
while soldiers differed in subsequent interviews as to what they were
ordered to do, there was unanimity in the understanding that all persons
and livestock were to be destroyed, and that they would probably receive
resistance from the VC in the area. They encountered none. After four
hours, over 500 elderly men, women, and children lay dead.
Jones documents not only the actions of March 16, 1968, but also
how Charlie Company engaged the enemy in previous weeks without
ever seeing them. In particular, members of 1st Platoon knew VC
soldiers had skinned alive an American soldier, and many members
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of the platoon had heard the soldier’s agonizing cries throughout the
night. Lieutenant William Calley of 1st Platoon had reportedly noted
his men’s response was, “you had to kill” (29). The extent to which
revenge was the motivating factor is part of the mystery associated with
the My Lai massacre.
Jones examined the depositions of many soldiers involved in the
operation and writes of rampant sexual assault and the horrific murder
of women and children. His words create a difficult narrative to read,
especially for combat veterans of any war. Perhaps the most revolting
picture of the more than forty-two presented in the book is one captioned
“Lunch break a few feet from a pile of bodies.” The picture shows no
apparent security cordon, just five soldiers relaxing after killing hundreds
of noncombatants.
Jones discusses the heroes of My Lai, particularly helicopter pilot
Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson and door gunner Specialist Lawrence
Colburn who confronted Calley and threatened to shoot American
soldiers if the killing did not stop. These men provided the most details
of the massacre prior to the formal investigation. The Army cover-up
and lengthy trials are major parts of the book, with the author providing
a very balanced look at the way the evidence linked the failures of
leadership to those connected, including Calley, and those acquitted,
including Captain Ernest Medina.
My Lai is the most complete and well-documented published
account of the massacre, one highly applicable to military leaders who
may be confronted with decisions about ordering men and women into
combat situations or in handling such information after war crimes are
alleged. My Lai should be read by active duty military personnel who
may have to engage enemy soldiers and make decisions about who are
noncombatants—at My Lai every person the soldiers encountered was
a noncombatant. Jones has done a great service to the field of military
history and Vietnam War scholarship with this very fine book.

Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army
on the Eve of the Korean War
By Thomas E. Hanson
Reviewed by Dr. Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army
Training and Doctrine Command

College Station: Texas A&M
University Press, 2010
158 pages
$45.00

I

n this history of the training of select US Army units in Japan on the
eve of the Korean War, author Thomas Hanson challenges a widely
embraced assessment of US Army units deployed in the immediate
aftermath of North Korea’s invasion of South Korea: their failure to
defeat those forces was attributable to occupation soldiers’ soft living.
Hanson effectively argues that such was not the case, at least not for the
quartet of infantry regiments that are his focus. The first three chapters
are the most valuable—indispensable context and a synthesis of what is
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to follow. Four central chapters, each covering a regiment representing
one of four infantry divisions in Eighth Army at the time, are impressive
in depth and detail. The conclusion reinforces points previously made
and offers several innovative and interesting thoughts on what might
have been, despite the author allowing himself a bit of subjectivity that
unfortunately detracts somewhat from the whole of his offering.
Hanson convincingly counters the allegation of “soft soldiers”
by demonstrating that commanders worked hard to train their
units in the months prior to the June 1950 incursion. He frequently
cites—and substantiates—factors impeding their efforts: undermanning, personnel turnover, frequent commander rotation, lack of
noncommissioned officers, deficient equipment, and ineffective training
areas. Division strengths were limited to 12,500 of 18,900 authorized for
financial reasons. Infantry regiments were short one battalion of three
authorized, and their artillery battalions were likewise deficient in one
of three batteries.
Army units in Japan remained an occupying force until early spring
of 1949, then transitioned to a defense of Japan mission, the primary
threat being the Soviet Union lurking not too distantly to the north of
Hokkaido. The mission should have been fair preparation for repelling
a North Korean attack a little over a year later, but volatility in the ranks
meant any training done other than at the individual level had a short halflife. Attempts at collective training, by necessity, had to await individual
preparation as seventeen weeks of pre-deployment basic training during
World War II had been cut by more than half to eight weeks by the late
1940s. And some soldiers arrived with less. Little wonder that Eighth
Army established its own basic training programs while subordinate
units were responsible for instilling branch-specific skills as, Hanson
relates, none of the latter training was provided stateside prior to a new
soldier’s arrival in Japan. It was a shortcoming redressed only in July
1950, the month following North Korea’s invasion.
Hanson is particularly critical of post–World War II officer
assignment policies in which leaders were assigned to command
positions with little if any attention given to previous experience. He
condemns “the assignment of patently unqualified officers to maneuver
unit command billets for their retirement tours . . . as one of the most
damaging policies implemented by the U.S. Army between 1945 and
1950” (37). The judgment may have value, but limiting his observation
to maneuver commands alone—a constraint that generally characterizes
the book as a whole—undervalues branch and combined arms expertise
so fundamental to the success of the US Army in World War II.
Recent veterans of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan will find some
of Hanson’s insights all too familiar. Relying on civilians for vehicle
maintenance in Japan due to manpower shortages meant those skills
were later lacking on the Korean peninsula, particularly given the 24/7
requirements of combat. Those involved in more recent conflicts in the
Middle East and Central Asia likely felt a similar sting when contractors
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who provided maintenance for key systems could not or would not
deploy forward. Veterans whose careers include Vietnam will likewise
shake their heads at Hanson’s observation that “punching command
tickets” was behind the overly rapid turnover among battalion and
regimental leaders. The 31st Infantry Regiment, 7th Infantry Division
had three commanders within eleven months when a new colonel
assumed command in the opening days of February 1950. Hanson
regrettably again allows objectivity to slip here, concluding—without
citing a justification—that “The assignment of non-infantry officers to
command infantry battalions . . . can only be described as the exacting
of revenge by bureaucratic agents uncomfortable with their own
contributions to national defense during World War II” (113).
Hanson’s work would have benefited from more strategic context.
Hanson does take “Lightning Joe” Collins and General Omar Bradley
to task for not demanding more in the way of support from the
administration and Congress. But he underestimates the impact of
ongoing fiscal wrestling among DoD Joint Chiefs facing a never-beforeseen era of atomic weapons.
Ultimately, this analysis of how four infantry regiments struggled
to overcome severe handicaps to prepare themselves for war provides
insights otherwise unavailable in other histories. Hanson’s point, that
despite very significant initial setbacks these units were fundamental to
slowing and eventually halting the North Korean advance is well taken.
The first units to cross the Sea of Japan fought and failed to stop South
Korea’s invaders in the war’s opening weeks. Yet in the weeks to follow,
these units would be part of the tide that washed northward once again
to regain the territory lost, and then some. This book puts the challenges
faced by these men in context showing that the months leading up to
those initial setbacks included tough training and too little support from
the command structure. Hanson’s work does much to set the record
straight in terms of the real reason those opening weeks progressed as
they did, while reminding US political and senior military leaders how
decisions made in illusionary periods of peace come home to roost when
the illusion dissipates.

